Personality Disorders Essay Example for Free

Personality Disorders Essay In this paper I will be discussing how a particular Axis I disorder may relate to a coexisting Axis II disorder. I will explain how an Axis I disorder, can be easily confused with an Axis II disorders. I will compare and contrast, Personality Disorder, Schizophrenia, and Paranoid Type, and explain how I would differentiate the two conditions. I will also compare Obsessive Personality Disorder and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, and explain the difference between both conditions. Personality Disorders Since the DSM III, the DSM classification has been used to describe the different parts of personality disorder. Every person is different in the way they think, feel and how they relate to others. Some people will have maladaptive personality traits, it becomes a personality disorder when the maladaptive behaviors become a problem and prevent them from leading a normal life. In the DSM –IV personality disorders and mental retardation are diagnosed on Axis II. A personality disorder can predispose a person to suffer with an Axis I disorder. (Widiger, 2003) According to the authors of the multiaxial system they wanted to draw attention to personality disorder because of the â€Å"accumulating evidence that the quality and quantity of preexisting personality disturbance may†¦influence the predisposition, manifestation, course, and response to treatment of various Axis I conditions†. Paranoid Personality Disorder and Schizophrenia Paranoid Personality Disorder is defined in the DSM-V –TR as a pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others such that their motives are interpreted as malevolent. (DSM-IV-TR 2005) Schizophrenia, Paranoid Type is defined as a type of schizophrenia in which the following criteria are met: A. Preoccupation with one or more delusion or frequent auditory hallucinations. The two disorders have many similarities but one thing that makes them different is that people that suffer with Paranoid Personality disorder do not have hallucinations. Obsessive -Compulsive Personality Disorder and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder Obsessive-Compulsive Personality Disorder is a pervasive pattern of preoccupation with orderliness, perfectionism, and mental and interpersonal  control. Obsessive Compulsive Disorder is defined as a person having either obsessions or compulsions. (DSM-V-TR 2005) People that suffer from OCD suffer from disturbing thoughts, or images and they have obsessions that interfere with their daily life. Some of these behaviors are irrational, ritualistic and repetitive. People that suffer from OCPD are worried about being perfect, and being in control mentally and interpersonally. People who suffer with OCPD are very problematic, unhappy, and experience issues with family, friends, and at work. The main difference in these two disorders is that people with OCD have actual obsessions and compulsions. People with OCDP don’t have obsessions and compulsions. References (2005). DSM-IV-TR. Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Association. Widiger, T. (2003, Oct). Personality disorder diagnosis. World Psychiatry, 2(2), 13

Autonomy in Determinism :: Determinism Papers

Autonomy in Determinism (1) ABSTRACT: There are good reasons for determinism — the option for pure freedom of will proves to be a non-tenable position. However, this collides with the everyday experience of autonomy. The following argument will attempt to show that determinism and autonomy are compatible. (1) A first consideration going back to MacKay makes clear that I myself cannot foresee in principle my own determination; hence fatalism has lost its grounds. (2) From the perspective of physical determination, I show that quantum-physical indetermination is not at all in a position to explain autonomy, while from the perspective of systems theory physical determination and autonomy is well-compatible. (3) The possibility of knowledge denotes a further increase of such autonomy. From this perspective, acting is something like designing-oneself or choice-of-oneself. (4) Consciousness of not being fixed in principle now becomes a determining condition of my acting, which appears to be determined by auton omy. This explains the ineradicable conviction that freedom of will is essential for human beings. (5) I conclude that the autonomy of acting is greater the more that rational self-determination takes the place of stupid arbitrariness. In 1980 a book by U. Pothast came out with the provocative title 'The Inadequacy of the Proofs for Freedom'. (2) Its merit consisted in the fact that it runs through and refutes all the known types of proofs for freedom in the philosophical tradition. Pothast's arguments, which thereby amount to determinism, are in my opinion basically sound, but surely also need a discriminating judgement, which is treated in the following discussion. The view mentioned is alarming in two respects: First of all, in accordance with the way we see ourselves we are convinced that freedom is essential for man's being. Secondly, philosophers think they have excellent arguments against determinism. The strongest objection to determinism is in my view the following: (3) Truth, i.e., accurate knowledge of the facts of a case is only possible for me when I can cognitively get involved with the subject. However, the precondition for this is that I am not determined by irrelevant constraints in connection with the subject — e.g., by physical factors or by my own biological-genetic constitution, but also not by prejudices and preconcieved notions: precisely because I could not involve myself in the subject because of such constraints. Reduced to a formula, this means: truth presupposes freedom. As a philosophical theory, determinism itself lays claim to truth, which therewith presupposes freedom, in accordance with what I have just said. Autonomy in Determinism :: Determinism Papers Autonomy in Determinism (1) ABSTRACT: There are good reasons for determinism — the option for pure freedom of will proves to be a non-tenable position. However, this collides with the everyday experience of autonomy. The following argument will attempt to show that determinism and autonomy are compatible. (1) A first consideration going back to MacKay makes clear that I myself cannot foresee in principle my own determination; hence fatalism has lost its grounds. (2) From the perspective of physical determination, I show that quantum-physical indetermination is not at all in a position to explain autonomy, while from the perspective of systems theory physical determination and autonomy is well-compatible. (3) The possibility of knowledge denotes a further increase of such autonomy. From this perspective, acting is something like designing-oneself or choice-of-oneself. (4) Consciousness of not being fixed in principle now becomes a determining condition of my acting, which appears to be determined by auton omy. This explains the ineradicable conviction that freedom of will is essential for human beings. (5) I conclude that the autonomy of acting is greater the more that rational self-determination takes the place of stupid arbitrariness. In 1980 a book by U. Pothast came out with the provocative title 'The Inadequacy of the Proofs for Freedom'. (2) Its merit consisted in the fact that it runs through and refutes all the known types of proofs for freedom in the philosophical tradition. Pothast's arguments, which thereby amount to determinism, are in my opinion basically sound, but surely also need a discriminating judgement, which is treated in the following discussion. The view mentioned is alarming in two respects: First of all, in accordance with the way we see ourselves we are convinced that freedom is essential for man's being. Secondly, philosophers think they have excellent arguments against determinism. The strongest objection to determinism is in my view the following: (3) Truth, i.e., accurate knowledge of the facts of a case is only possible for me when I can cognitively get involved with the subject. However, the precondition for this is that I am not determined by irrelevant constraints in connection with the subject — e.g., by physical factors or by my own biological-genetic constitution, but also not by prejudices and preconcieved notions: precisely because I could not involve myself in the subject because of such constraints. Reduced to a formula, this means: truth presupposes freedom. As a philosophical theory, determinism itself lays claim to truth, which therewith presupposes freedom, in accordance with what I have just said.

No Good Reasons To Believe in Dualism Essay

Are there any good reasons to believe in dualism? Dualism, the philosophical theory that states that there are two kinds of substance: mental and physical, is now largely discredited by the world’s leading philosophers. It first came to prominence through Renà ¯Ã‚ ¿Ã‚ ½ Descartes in his Meditations as he tried to come to terms with the fact that most of his knowledge was either false or that he did not have enough evidence to believe in it firmly enough. For many centuries the idea was debated and reclassified, changing slightly from philosopher to philosopher and being totally rejected by others. The alternative to dualism is monism, the idea that mental and physical substances are one and the same; that is that the mind is or is contained within (in the tissue of), the brain. At first it appeared that dualism was indeed a logical conception, as features of the mind and the body seemed very different indeed. Descartes pointed out that while one could imagine oneself without physical features, it was impossible to imagine oneself without a mind; indeed the very action of attempting this was enough to prove that a mind was present. This was the basis of Descartes’ theory to draw out basic knowledge that he could not be deceived about. Due to this distinction it seemed logical to conclude, using Leibniz’s Law, that physical and mental entities were indeed separate. However, Descartes had made a mistake in assuming that his clear and distinct perceptions of a thing made that thing possible. For example, I can clearly and distinctly conceive of a unicorn, but that does not mean that they exist. (Lewis Carroll parodied this in Through the Looking Glass, in which the Red Queen tells Alice she imagines several impossible things before breakfast. Presumably she has a clear and distinct perception of these things, as when Alice attempts it, she is told she is not trying hard enough.) Also, I can just as clearly perceive of something not being as of it being, and as something cannot both be and not be, it would seem that this theory for basing something upon an unalterable internal proposition falls down. So, the argument from clear and distinct perception cannot be used here as it is just as easy to conceive of the mind and body being separate as it is for them to be one and the same. There are many scientific and logical arguments in favour of monism, Occam’s Razor, for example, a theory which asks us to take the simpler solution to a problem over the more complicated theory. For example, before the biology of animals was worked out scientifically, it was believed that all living creatures had an attribute called vitalism, which kept it alive. Now we know the biology, we can use this much simpler explanation. Here it can be applied easily: obviously it is simpler to believe in one substance than two, one of which does not conform to the laws of physics. There is also scientific evidence that shows us how damaging or experimenting with the brain, which is undeniably physical, can affect a person’s mental behaviour. Performing a lobotomy, for instance, can totally alter a person’s personality – turning them from being calm and rational to being crude and rash, or vice versa. Similarly, stimulating neurons on the Thingybob Strip, which crosses the top of the brain, can cause sensations all over the body. It may be that prodding a part of this strip can make your elbow tingle in a most delightful manner or make your thumb feel as if it is being dragged through warm treacle. It would seem from this that the these feelings are to be found in the prodded part of the brain and this is where the mental is to be found within the physical. These reasons show that monism is probably the more scientifically favourable position, but are there any reasons that can show Dualism to be the more logical choice? Leibniz’s Law might argue for dualism in that there being differences between the physical and the mental, they must therefore be separate substances. For example, having a chunk of the physical removed does not mean a part of the mental has also been removed. In fact, an awful lot of the physical body can be harmed, even in the brain, before there is a definite mental side effect. Surely, say the dualists, if the some parts of the mental were contained within certain parts of the brain, for example, if the capacity to taste lentils were located solely in a small part of the brain, and that part were to be removed we would no longer have the capacity to taste lentils. But a lot of the brain can be removed, and so, if there were set areas we would be removing certain abilities of the mental. Therefore, the mental must be separate from the physical. However, it is true that removing some areas of the brain will prevent the mental from performing certain capabilities. It is possible to find out which areas of the brain are functioning when fuelled by particular stimuli, and if, when doing this we slice out those areas of the brain, in some (but not all) cases, those functions will no longer be possible. Also, the left side of the brain and the right side provide vastly different functions – one being more practical and other being more intellectual. This would seem to back up the monist theory that the mind is located within certain parts of the brain. Another counter argument to Dualism could be contained within Feigl’s concept of Nomological Danglers. If the mental is indeed distinct from the physical it cannot be present within the same world as the physical things we know of, as removing physicals things would inevitably reveal the mental substance. Therefore it follows that it is connected to this physical world in some other way. However, Feigl tells us that it is ridiculous to believe that there is a separate type of law for these substances, which allows them to exist dependently of the rest of physics. Surely the mental substances cannot be ‘dangling’ outside of the realms of reality? These masses of arguments for monism overwhelm the poorer, outdated arguments for dualism, which stem from a less scientifically advanced age, in which the solutions appeared to work logically, based on a more internal philosophy of contemplation, which is now being replaced by a more practical philosophy, backed up by the sciences. Hence it is not unfair to say that previous ideas that worked in favour of dualism are no longer good reasons to believe the theory and that as we have better reasons to take the theory of monism seriously, we must subscribe to it, and not dualism, as the correct theory.

Sexuality Education Is Not All About Sex - 2620 Words

Sexuality is huge and even more for those living with special needs especially because they tend to get totalized by their illness. Often their sexuality will be looked over or forgotten regardless of their desire and need to feel wanted intimately. Sexuality education is not all about sex. â€Å"Sexuality education is a life-long process that encompasses many things: the biological, socio-cultural, psychological, and spiritual dimensions of sexuality† (Gerhardt, 2012). Sexuality education is about safety, love, identity, sexual and nonsexual relationships, intimacy, positive adaptive behaviors, increased self-esteem, and pro-social behaviors (Hartman, 2014). Not many parents enjoy the idea of facing the idea of sexual education with their†¦show more content†¦3. Are there any known applications of technology developed to address these issues (e.g. ABA tools or psychoeducational or social skills training programs)? 4. What does the research in this area suggest for fu ture studies and new program development? This is a topic that makes people uncomfortable because of the attached stigmas and taboos. This makes being honest, open, and serious about this topic difficult. â€Å"Sexuality is an integral part of the personality of everyone: man, woman, and child. It is a basic need and an aspect of being human that cannot be separated from other aspects of human life. Sexuality if not synonymous with sexual intercourse and it influences thoughts, feelings, actions, and interactions, and thereby our mental and physical health† (World Health Organization). What I like about this definition is that it states that sexuality is a social and adaptive behavior that is part of human development and influences out sexual health. Sexual health is â€Å"a state of physical, mental, and social well-being in a relation to sexuality. It requires a positive and respectful approach to sexuality and sexual relationships, as well as the possibility of having p leasurable and safe sexual experiences, free of coercion, discrimination, and violence† (World Health Organization). This definition highlights that sexual health is related to our well-being and relating it to having safe sexual experiences. Again, the topic of sexuality